Hardly a Walk in the Park: Courts\u27 Hostile Treatment of Site-Specific Works under VARA by Cascio, Virginia M.
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology 
& Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 20 
Issue 1 Fall 2009 Article 7 
Hardly a Walk in the Park: Courts' Hostile Treatment of Site-
Specific Works under VARA 
Virginia M. Cascio 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip 
Recommended Citation 
Virginia M. Cascio, Hardly a Walk in the Park: Courts' Hostile Treatment of Site-Specific Works under 
VARA, 20 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 167 (2009) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol20/iss1/7 
This Case Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an 
authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
HARDLY A WALK IN THE PARK: COURTS'
HOSTILE TREATMENT OF SITE-SPECIFIC
WORKS UNDER VARA
"Men do change, and change comes like a little
wind that ruffles the curtains at dawn, and it comes
like the stealthy perfume of wildflowers hidden in
the grass."--John Steinbeck1
I. INTRODUCTION
As you walk through Grant Park on your way to downtown
Chicago, you enjoy the ordered, natural splendor of two beautiful
elliptical fields of wildflowers.2 The pleasure is further amplified
by the seasonal transformation of nature's palette that brings forth
a kaleidoscope of colors and patterns as new flowers emerge and
older ones fade.3 Now, after twenty years of enjoying this park,
one day you discover that sixty percent of the flowers have been
destroyed, and those remaining have been abandoned to grow
without care.' Imagine the feelings of the artist who created this
living canvas when witnessing the culmination of his life's work
destroyed by the Chicago Park District without notice after twenty
1. JOHN STEINBECK, SWEET THURSDAY 20 (The Viking Press 1954).
2. See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 WL 4449886, at *1,
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008).
3. See generally id.; Ray Quintanilla, Bed of Prairie Wildflowers Help Wake
Up Downtown, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 1994, at 1. For images of Wildflower Works
I, see Chapman Kelley, http://www.chapmankelley.com/Gallery.asp?GalleryID
=18115&AKey=JLBDK6W2 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
4. See generally Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *3; Hal Dardick, Garden too
wild for new park landscape; Wildflower artist sees part of work now destroyed,
CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2004, at 4. For photographs of the modified Wildflower
Works I, see Matthias Merkel Hess, Wildflower Works Follow Up (June 30,
2009), http://www.sustainablepractice.org/2009/06/30/wildflower-works-
followup.
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years of tending and sustaining his artistic vision.' What should
the artist do in this situation? Should the Park District be allowed
to change the work simply because it is on park property? If not,
what remedies should the artist have to protect his work from
destruction?
In 1990, through the passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act
("VARA"), Congress enacted protection for certain violations
against art such as the alteration or destruction of a piece of
artwork.6 However, in part because the Act was implemented to
appease an international standard, VARA has proven to be
ineffective in protecting artists' rights, because it has been
perceived to threaten common law property rights.7 This has
caused federal courts to interpret VARA narrowly, which further
limits the protection of artwork.8 In Kelley v. Chicago Park
District, the Northern District of Illinois refused to extend VARA
protection to the plaintiffs work, which was entitled Wildflower
Works I, because the court determined that the work was not
copyrightable and that it was site-specific, thus excluding the work
from protection under VARA.9
In Part II, this Note will look at the historical background of
moral rights, focus on the United States' adoption of VARA, and
describe the courts' treatment of these cases, particularly of site-
specific art. Part III will summarize the Kelley opinion,
highlighting how the district court refused to extend VARA
protection because the work was not copyrightable and because it
was site-specific. Part IV will analyze the district court's opinion
to illuminate how and why the courts fear granting VARA
protection when it goes against the common law view of property
5. See Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *3.
6. For the text of VARA, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A, 113 (2006).
7. See Francesca Garson, Before that Artist Came Along, It was Just a
Bridge: The Visual Artists Rights Act and the Removal of Site-Specific Artwork,
11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 213 (2001); Natalia Thurston, Buyer
Beware: the Unexpected Consequences of the Visual Artists Rights Act, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 701, 705 (2005).
8. See generally Rebecca Stuart, A Work of Heart: A Proposalfor a Revision
of the Visual Rights Act of 1990 to Bring the United States Closer to
International Standards, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 645, 660-69 (2007)
(summarizing cases where the courts narrowly interpret VARA).
9. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *6.
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in the United States. In addition, this part will emphasize the
court's incorrect narrowing of VARA because VARA's legislative
history and plain language protect site-specific work. Finally, in
Part V, this Note will suggest ways for site-specific artists to
protect their rights through effective contracts in light of the lack
of protection that they have received from the interpretation of
VARA.
The district court's narrow interpretation of VARA and its
hostility to the plaintiffs claim illustrates that the courts, fearing
the restriction of property rights, have mistakenly limited the scope
of VARA to the point that it is no longer a viable source of
protection for site-specific artists. Thus, unless Congress and the
courts take steps to strengthen VARA rights, site-specific artists
will be forced to revert back to the less effective and protective
pre-VARA claims provided by contract law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What are Moral Rights?
Originally championed in France and other civil law countries,
moral rights or droit moral, protect the artist's non-economic
rights, including the artist's reputation and the integrity of his
work, even after the sale and transfer of the piece of artwork."
Arising out of the theory of natural rights, the policy behind moral
rights is that "an author has the right to reap the fruits of his
creations, obtain rewards for his contributions to society, and
protect the integrity of his creations as extensions of his
10. Amy M. Alder, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263, 266 (2009);
Kristin Robbins, Artists Beware: The Effect of the First Circuit's Refusal to
Apply VARA to Site-Specific Art, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 395, 396-97
(2007). The recognized moral rights include: attribution, integrity, disclosure,
resale royalty, withdrawal and protection from excessive criticism. PATTY
GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW 173 (Carolina
Academic Press 2nd ed. 2008). For more information on the individual rights,
see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.03-
05 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 2009); Susan P. Liemer, Understanding
Artists'Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 41 (1998).
2009]
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personality."" Based on this theory, civil law countries group
moral rights with their copyright statutes, because they consider
moral rights to be integral to copyright law as rights existing in
"works of authorship."' 2  Both economic copyright and moral
rights are rights of the author in his work and are thus protected
and analyzed within similar framework. "
B. Moral Rights in the United States
The United States and other common law countries have been
slow to adopt moral rights in their copyright laws. 4 A reason for
this resistance is that the copyright system under common law
countries is based on utilitarianism, the object of which is to create
a system to "'encourage artists to create' and 'to enrich[] society at
the least cost to the consumers' by granting economic rights to
the artists. 5 This utilitarian focus on economic incentives does not
support the theory of moral rights, because moral rights do not
facilitate commerce. '
6
Furthermore, moral rights conflict with the common law of
property, which emphasizes the importance of complete control
over one's property. " In allowing the artist to retain moral rights
to his work, this control is limited to some extent.' 8 For example,
suppose an artist sold his painting to a restaurant owner who
displays it in his restaurant and attributes the painting to the artist.
After owning the painting for a number of years, the owner
decides to "improve" the painting and draws a big smiley face in
the middle of the painting, but he continues to display it as the
artist's work. In a country protecting the artist's right of
11. Stuart, supra note 8, at 672. See also J. Carolina Chavez, Copyrights
"Elephant in the Room": A Realistic Look at the Role of Moral Rights in
Modern American Copyright, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 125, 131 (2008).
12. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J.
353,360 (2006).
13. Id. at 360.
14. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 10, at 173. See also Garson, supra note 7, at
214; Thurston, supra note 7, at 705.
15. Chavez, supra note 11, at 127; Stuart, supra note 8, at 672.
16. Stuart, supra note 8, at 673.
17. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 10, at 173.
18. Id.
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attribution and integrity, the artist could bring a legal action to
remove his name from being associated with the painting and
recover damages for its alteration. 9 This concept is at odds with
the common law of property because it emphasizes the importance
of an owner having complete control over his property."z Under
common law, the restaurant owner was within his rights to draw a
smiley face.21 In a country that recognizes moral rights, the artist
retains a right to prevent such alteration in his work, which limits
the ownership rights of the property owner.22
The United States has reluctantly incorporated some moral
rights protection into its statutory law.23 In 1988, after over 100
years of debate, the United States finally ratified the Berne
Convention in order to gain more protection for American
intellectual property, such as computer software, but with the
express caveat that the ratification did not incorporate moral rights
into United States laws.24 The Berne Convention codified moral
rights in Article 6bis. 5 Congress felt that artists had sufficient
19. See generally Liemer, supra note 10, at 47-52; NiMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 10, at § 8D.03-04.
20. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 10, at 173.
21. See generally Garson, supra note 7, 214; GERSTENBLITH, supra note 10,
at 173; Thurston, supra note 7, at 702; 714-16.
22. Thurston, supra note 7, at 701-02; 716.
23. Karen M. Corr, Protection of Art Work Through Artists' Rights: An
Analysis of State Law and Proposal for Change, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 855, 856-57
(1989); Stuart, supra note 8, at 652.
24. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 10, at 187. The Berne Convention was first
ratified in September 9, 1886. Congress ratified it with the specific provision:
CERTAIN RIGHTS NOT AFFECTED. -- The provisions of the Berne
Convention, the adherence of the United States thereto, and satisfaction of
United States obligations thereunder, do not expand or reduce any right of an
author of a work, whether claimed under Federal, State, or the common law -
(1) to claim authorship of the work; or
(2) to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to the work, that would prejudice the author's
honor or reputation.
An Act to amend title 17, Untied States Code, to implement the Beme
Convention for the Protection of Library and Artistic Works, as revised at Paris
on July 24, 1971, and for other purposes, Pub. L No. 100-568 (1988).
25. Chavez, supra note 11, at 135. Article 6bis states:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
2009]
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protection with other causes of action such as defamation, unfair
competition, breach of contract, and violation of the Lanham Act.26
Yet artists have rarely brought successful actions under these
claims, because the courts would often discern that the artist was
trying to infer moral rights protection and thus would refuse to
grant the protection until legislative action was taken.27
C. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
Eventually, in 1990, moral rights advocates persuaded Congress
to incorporate moral rights into the Copyright Act with the passage
of the Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA").2" VARA was
intended to cultivate "a climate of artistic worth and honor that
encourages the author in the arduous act of creation" and
"protect[][] both the reputations of certain visual artists and the
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or derogatory action
in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.
Chavez, supra note 11, at 135 n.59 (quoting Beme Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 1986, revised July
24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 28 U.N.T.S. 221).
26. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 10, 187; Stuart, supra note 8, at 652.
27. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 10, 187; Stuart, supra note 8, at 652. See also,
e.g., Serra v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir.
1988) (when the artist tried to prevent the removal of his sculpture on the basis
of a violation of his First Amendment and Due Process rights, the court held that
neither were violated based on the fact that he had "no protected property
interest in the continued display" of his sculpture); Vargas v. Esquire, Inc. 164
F.2d 522, 527 (7th Cir. 1947) (when plaintiff used a contract action to argue for
right of attribution, the court commented that "what plaintiff in reality seeks is a
change in the law of this country to conform to that of certain other countries");
Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church in New York, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1949) (when plaintiff used a contract action to prove that the
defendant should have given him notice before removing mural, the court
refused to hold that the plaintiff had any interests in the mural outside of the
contract).
28. Alder, supra note 10, at 266. See also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How
Fine Art Fares Post-VARA, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 4 (1997)
("Significantly, on the last day of the 101st Congress, a major bill was passed
which authorized eighty-five new federal judgeships. Sponsors of this bill had to
include several unrelated measures in order to appease senators who otherwise
would oppose the federal judgeships bill. One such measure was VARA ....").
[Vol. XX: I
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works of art they create."'2 9
In order to be protected under VARA, a work must: (1) be
copyrightable, (2) fall within the categories designated by the
statute, and (3) not be subject to an exception.3" First, the artwork
must be copyrightable under the Copyright Act of 1976."' In order
to be copyrightable, a work must be an "original [work] of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which [it] can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. 3 2  Works of authorship include
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works."33  The Copyright Act
does not protect "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work."34
Second, the work must be a "work of visual art" as defined by
VARA's positive and negative arms.35 The positive arm protects
only works of visual art defined as "a painting, drawing, print, or
sculpture... or a still photographic image produced for exhibition
purposes only."36 The works must either be a single copy or "in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author. 3 7  The negative arm
29. H.R. REP.NO. 101-514, at 5 (1990).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
31. Id.
32. Id. at § 102(a).
33. Id. at § 102(a)(5).
34. Id. at § 102(b).
35. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 84 (2nd Cir. 1995).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
37. Id. In addition, the medium of the artwork stipulates certain
requirements such as the artist's signature that must be met in order to fall under
VARA. The statute reads:
A "work of visual art" is--
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single
copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are
signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the
case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated
sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by
the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of
the author; or
2009]
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excludes from protection many utilitarian and mass produced
works including "any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing,
diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual
work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic
information service, electronic publication, or similar publication,"
advertising material and works for hire.38
VARA further narrows the rights extended to artwork by
stipulating four exceptions to the categories of protected artwork.39
First, an artist's right of integrity is not violated by "the
modification of a work of visual art which is a result of the passage
of time or the inherent nature of the materials."4 ° Second, "the
modification of a work of visual art which is the result of
conservation, or of the public presentation, including lighting and
placement, of the work" does not violate the right of integrity or
the right to prevent destruction of a work of recognized stature.4"
Third, the rights of integrity and attribution will "not apply to any
reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a work in, upon,
or in any connection with any item" in the negative arm of
VARA.4
2
Finally, the fourth "building exception" allows artwork that "has
been incorporated in or made part of a building" to be removed
without violating the artist's right of integrity or right to prevent
destruction of a work of recognized stature.43 If removal of the
work "will cause the destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the work," the building owner may remove it if it
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition
purposes only, existing in a single copy that is signed by the
author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are
signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Laura Flahive Wu, Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art v.
Biichel: Construing Artists' Rights in the Context of Institutional Commissions,
32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 151, 158 (2008).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1).
41. Id. at § 106A(c)(2).
42. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 8D.06(B)(2) (quoting 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(c)(3) and 17 U.S.C. § 101). See also Wu, supra note 39, at 158.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 1 13(d)(I)(A)-(B).
174 [Vol. XX: I
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falls into one of two categories.' For works installed before
VARA's effective date of June 1, 1991, the author must have
consented to the installation of the work.45 For works installed
after June 1, 1991, the owner and the artist must have signed a
contract stipulating installation with the waiver of integrity rights
if the work is removed.46 If the artwork can be removed "without
the destruction, distortion, mutilation or other modification of the
work," then the owner may remove the work only if he "made a
diligent, good faith attempt without success to notify the author of
the owner's intended action" or "the owner did provide such notice
in writing and the person so notified failed, within 90 days after
receiving such notice, either to remove the work or to pay for its
removal."47
After a court determines that the artwork is protected under
VARA, the court then must interpret whether the artist is granted
the right of attribution and integrity.48 The right of attribution,
which protects the artist's name and reputation, gives the artist the
right "to claim authorship of that work, and to prevent the use of
his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or
she did not create."49 If the work suffers "distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his
or her honor or reputation," then the artist may stop his name from
being associated with the work. °
The right of integrity allows the artist to bring an action in order
"to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her
honor or reputation." "1 In addition, an artist may "prevent any
destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or
grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that
44. Id.
45. Id. at § 113(d)(1)(B). The effective date is six months after the
December 1, 1990 enactment, which is June 1, 1991. Id. at § 106A.
46. Id. at § 113(d)(1)(B).
47. Id. at § 113(d)(2)(A)-(B).
48. Id. at § 106A(a)(1)(A)-(B).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A)-(B). See also Liemer, supra note 10, at 47-
49; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 8D.06(B)(1).
50. Id. at § 106A(a)(2).
51. Id. at § 106A(a)(3)(A). See also Liemer, supra note 10, at 50-52;
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 8D.06(C)(1).
2009]
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right."52 VARA does not define recognized stature, but case law
has found that the artist must show "(1) that the visual art in
question has "stature," i.e. is viewed as meritorious, and (2) that
this stature is "recognized" by art experts, other members of the
artistic community, or by some cross-section of society."53 Artists
are entitled to VARA rights until their death. 4 These rights may
be waived in writing but may not be transferred at anytime.5
Given the narrow scope and complicated nature of VARA, it can
be extremely difficult for an artist to bring claims under VARA
successfully. 6 In fact, since its passage, only one artist has won a
claim under VARA.57 Moreover, fearing both judicial activism
and restraint on personal property, the courts insist on a narrow
interpretation of the statute so that the work often falls outside the
scope of protection.5
52. Id. at § 106A(a)(3)(B).
53. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
See, e.g., Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999);
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 8D.06(C)(1).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1).
55. Id. at § 106A(e).
56. Stuart, supra note 8, at 659. See also Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate,
Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that VARA does not protect
site-specific work); Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 366 (2nd Cir. 2003)
(holding that, even though the work was artistic, it was used to promote or
advertise which fell outside the scope of VARA protection); Carter v. Helmsley-
Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2nd Cir. 1995) (holding that VARA did not protect the
work because it was a work for hire by applying a multiple factor test and
reversing the district court's conclusion).
57. Stuart, supra note 8, at 658. See also Martin, 192 F.3d at 613 (holding
that the artist's work was of recognized stature and he could recover for its
destruction).
58. See generally Stuart, supra note 8, at 660-69. In Phillips, the First
Circuit justified its holding to exclude site-specific art from VARA protection
by stating:
Once a piece of art is considered site-specific, and protected
by VARA, such objects could not be altered by the property
owner absent consent of the artist. Such a conclusion could
dramatically affect real property interests and laws ... If such
protection is necessary, Congress should do the job. We
cannot do it by rewriting the statute in the guise of statutory
interpretation.
Phillips, 459 F.3d at 142-43.
[Vol. XX: I
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D. The Treatment of Site-Specific Artwork under VARA
Site-specific art, a type of integrated art, incorporates the
location and environment into the artwork. 9 The purpose is, "to
become part of its locale, and to restructure the viewer's
conceptual and perceptual experience of that locale through the
artist's intervention."6 The location is an essential element of the
piece and integral to the artistic vision.61 Government agencies
and private owners commission site-specific work in order to
beautify and enhance a building or public area.62
1. The First Circuit's Opinion in Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate
In Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., the First Circuit,
fearing the restraint of site-specific art on real property, adopted a
bright-line rule and held that VARA did not protect site-specific
art.63 David Phillips, a sculptor on commission from Pembroke
Real Estate, Inc., designed twenty-seven sculptures for Eastport
Park in Boston, incorporating the location into the design and the
placement of the sculptures.64  When Pembroke decided to
redesign the Park, requiring the alteration and relocation of his
sculptures, Phillips brought an action under VARA for injunctive
relief to prevent removal of his sculptures on the grounds that
59. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 129. Integrated art "is comprised of two or more
physical objects that must be presented together as the artist intended for the
work to retain its meaning." Id. See also Carrie Jones, Site-Specific Art Parks
on Moral Ground: Distilling Old Whine in New Battles Over the Visual Artists
Rights Act, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 355, 380-85 (2005); Lauren Ruth
Spotts, Phillips has left VARA Little Protection for Site-Specific Artists, 16 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 297, 300-05 (2009).
60. Spotts, supra note 59, at 300 (quoting Guggenheim Museum, Site-
specific art/Environmental art, http://1 www.guggenheimcollection.org/site/move
mentworksSite.specific art_ Environmental art0.html).
61. See Jones, supra note 59, at 380-81
62. Jones, supra note 59, at 380; Spotts, supra note 59, at 301-02.
63. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 143. For other site-specific cases, see Bd. of
Managers of Soho Int'l Arts Condo. v. City of N.Y., No. 01 Civ. 1226 (DAB),
2003 WL 21403333, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003); English v. BFC & R E.
11th St. LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446(HB), 1997 WL 746444, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
3, 1997).
64. Phillips 459 F.3d at 129-30.
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removal would destroy his work conceptually.65 The First Circuit
held that VARA did not protect site-specific art.66
In its decision, the First Circuit rejected the district court's
analysis that VARA protected site-specific art.67 The district court
held that "a work of visual art" under VARA included site-specific
art, but "the public presentation exception permits the removal of
site-specific art."68 The First Circuit found this argument to be
unpersuasive because the very removal of a site-specific work
would destroy the work and the statute would not protect the
artwork but then allow its destruction.69
Second, the First Circuit rejected Phillips's "dual regime"
argument that VARA has a different standard depending on the
type of art.7" Phillips argued that the public presentation exception
should only apply to "plop-art" that does not incorporate the
environment into its surroundings, such as moving a painting to
another wall.71 The First Circuit found his argument to be
problematic because it "would require [the court], essentially, to
rewrite VARA" and go against the plain language of the statute.72
Rejecting this argument, the First Circuit drew a bright line
excluding site-specific artwork from protection under VARA.73
The District Court for the Northen District of Illinois in Kelley v.
Chicago Part District, the subject of this note, relied heavily on
the First Circuit's holding.
III. THE OPINION IN KELLEY V. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1984, Chapman Kelley, an internationally known artist,
received permission from the Chicago Park District to create an
65. Id. at 128, 131-32, 140.
66. Id. at 143.
67. Id. at 139-40.
68. Id. at 140.
69. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 140.
70. Id. at 140.
71. Id. at 134; 140-43.
72. Id. at 142.
73. Id. at 143.
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exhibit entitled Wildflower Works I ("Wildflower").74 In the initial
permit, the Park District gave Kelley the right to use its land to
display his work." Kelley was responsible for the expenses
required to install and maintain this work. 76 The permit included a
clause that allowed the Park District to request the removal of
Wildflower after ninety days of notice.77 In June 1984, Kelley
planted Wildflower in Grant Park. 8 It "consisted of two elliptical
shapes, formed by gravel and metal edging that enclosed two beds
of wildflowers, which were laid out in accordance with Kelley's
design. 79 Wildflower received national attention from the media
and government officials.8"
In 1988, when the Park District gave Kelley ninety days notice
to terminate the permit, Kelley filed a lawsuit in the Northern
District of Illinois claiming that the Park District was violating his
First Amendment rights.8' The Park District settled this case by
agreeing to renew the permit for another year, with a clause setting
forth the property rights of both parties in respect to Wildflower.82
74. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 WL 4449886, at *1.
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008). For information on Chapman Kelley's career and
accomplishments, see Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2-3, Kelley v. Chi. Park
Dist., No. 08-3701 & No. 08-3712 (7th Cir. Apr. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/14288104/Chapman-Kelley-Opening-Brief-in-the-
7th-Cir-April-13-2009; Chapman Kelley.com, http://www.chapmankelley.com/
Asset.asp?AssetlD=6098&AKey=JLBDK6W2.
75. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at * 1.
76. Id.
77. Id. The clause states: "[t]his installation is subject to a 90 day notice to
remove the planting upon
written notice from the General Superintendent." Id.
78. ld.
79. Id. For photographs of the completed Wildflower, see supra note 3.
80. Id. at *2.
81. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *2.
82. Id. The clause stated:
The planting material is the property of Mr. Chapman Kelley.
If the Chicago Park District does not extend the Permit by
September 1, 1989, Mr. Kelley may remove the planting
material. If this Permit is not extended by September 1, 1989,
the permittees are not required to restore the planted area to its
original condition . . . . This agreement does not create an
proprietary interest for Chicago Wildflower Works, Inc. [a
non-profit corporation associated with the exhibit], and/or Mr.
2009] 179
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The Park District renewed the permit in 1989, 1990, and 1992.3
The last permit expired on September 30, 1994, but Kelley
continued to maintain Wildflower without a permit until June 9,
2004.84 In March 2004, the Park District commissioner Margaret
Burroughs allegedly told Kelley and the President of the
Wildflower Works, Inc., "[y]ou're still there, aren't you? That's
all you need to do," which they took to mean no further permit was
needed.85
In May 2004, the Park District decided to alter and change the
area containing Wildflower. 6 On June 10, 2004, Kelley attended a
planning meeting to discuss the changes, but he did not approve of
the options.87 Despite his disapproval, the Park District "reduced
the wild flower-planted spaces ... from roughly 66,000 square feet
to under 30,000 square feet, and reconfigured the two ellipses as
rectilinear shapes. The wildflower beds were edged with new
evergreen hedges."88
Kelley filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois
requesting damages for a violation of his right of integrity and
breach of contract.89 The district court held that VARA does not
protect Wildflower but that the Park District had breached its
implied contract.9" The case is currently on appeal to the Seventh
Circuit.91
Chapman Kelley in continuing to operate and maintain the
Wildflower Garden Display after September 1, 1989.
Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *3.
87. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *3.
88. Id. For photographs of the reconfiguration, see supra note 4.
89. Id. at *1.
90. Id. at *6, *8.
91. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 74; Martha Lufkin, Artist
Chapman Kelley Launches Federal Appeal over Chicago Wildflower Work, ART
NEWSPAPER, June 4, 2009, http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Artist% 20
Chapman%20Kelley%201aunches%2Ofederal%20appeal%20over%20Chicago
%20Wildflower%20work/I 7459.
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B. The District Court's Discussion
1. VARA Does Not Protect Wildflower Works L
The district court began its analysis by determining that
Wildflower is a work of visual art.92 VARA defines a "work of
visual art" as "a painting, drawing, print or sculpture" but does not
define these terms.93 The district court pointed to "a tension
between the law and the evolution of ideas in modem and avant
garde art; the former requires legislatures to taxonomize artistic
creations, whereas the latter is occupied with the expanding
definition of what we accept to be art."94  The court must,
therefore, find a balance between adhering to the "'plain and
ordinary' meanings" of art and taking into account the changing
concept of art.95 In order to achieve this balance, the court
considered both the dictionary definition of the art terms, as well
as testimony from art experts.96  The court concluded that
Wildflower was both a sculpture and a painting, and, therefore, "a
work of visual art" as stipulated by VARA.97
Second, the court excluded Wildflower from VARA protection
by determining that it lacked originality and, thus, was not
92. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *4-'5.
93. Id. at *3-*4.
94. Id. at *4.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *5. The district court defined sculpture as "a three-dimensional
work of art, "and heard testimony suggesting that "any non-two dimensional art
form . . .including environmental art and some conceptual art" should be
included as well. Id. This led the court to find that Wildflower was a sculpture
because "the manipulation of the flowers, metal, and gravel into an elliptical
shape fits within the broadest of the definitions of sculpture." Id. For defining a
painting, the court considered the testimony that Wildflower "was conceived as
a painting to be viewed from a height, and that many paintings are, in fact, three
dimensional" and the definition of paint, which included "to decorate, adorn, or
variegate by applying lines and colors." Id. Applying these definitions, the
court found Wildflower to be a painting because "an exhibit that corrals the
variegation of wildflowers in bloom into pleasing oval swatches, as Wildflower
Works did, could certainly fit within some of the above definitions of a
painting." Id. (italics added).
97. Id.
20091
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copyrightable.98 Under the Copyright Act, in order for an object to
be copyrightable, it must be an "original [work] of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression."99 Under the same
analysis for finding Wildflower to be "a work of visual art," the
district court determined that Wildflower fit into the categories of
"pictorial, graphic and sculptural works.""1 ' However, the district
court found that Wildflower was not original, because Kelley did
not adequately prove originality."°' Therefore, Wildflower was not
copyrightable and not protected by VARA. "2
2. VARA Does Not Protect Site-Specific Artwork.
Furthermore, the court stated that even if Wildflower was
copyrightable, VARA would not protect it because Wildflower was
site-specific.' 3 The district court concluded that Wildflower was
site-specific, because Kelley deliberately chose the location in
order to incorporate Chicago's skyline into his artistic vision and
had characterized it as site-specific in his deposition.' " Noting
that few cases deal with site-specific issues, the district court found
the First Circuit's reasoning in Phillips to be persuasive and
applied the First Circuit's Phillips holding that VARA does not
protect site-specific work.'05 The district court found that VARA
did not protect Wildflower because it was site-specific. 06
3. The Park District Breached the Implied Contract.
Although the court determined that Wildflower was not
protected under VARA, the court found that the Park District
breached the implied contract by not providing Kelley with
reasonable notice before it reconfigured Wildflower."7 The court
98. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *6.
99. Id. at *5 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102)
100. Id. at *6.
101. Id. at *6.
102. Id. at *6.
103. Id. at *6.
104. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *7.
105. Id. at *6-*7.
106. Id. at *7
107. Id. at *8.
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found that Burroughs's statement constituted an implied contract
to extend the temporary permit.'0 8 The court pointed out that even
though the temporary permit did not include the ninety-day notice
of the first permit, it gave Kelley the right to remove his work
when the permit expired. °9 Thus, the Park District should have
given him a reasonable amount of time to remove the work, which
the court found to be ninety days."0 The court held that the Park
District breached this implied contract."'
C. The District Court awarded Kelley One Dollar in Damages.
Finally, the court discussed Kelley's request for damages and
determined that Kelley did not adequately prove his damages to a
reasonable degree of certainty." 2 Kelley wanted damages "for the
material removed by the Park District," which would be calculated
by "the value of the plants that Kelley could have removed, less
the costs of removal.""' 3 Kelley's expert witness estimated the
cost of the wildflower plants in Wildflower but did not take into
account "the approximately 30,000 square feet of Kelley's
wildflowers that remain in Grant Park, the percentage of
Wildflower Works that had been overtaken by invasive weeds by
2004, the wildflowers removed during the garden's
reconfiguration but replanted afterward, or the cost to Kelley of
removing and transporting those wildflowers .... .""' Without this
additional evidence, the court concluded that he did not prove
damages to a reasonable degree of certainty and awarded him one
dollar. '
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF KELLEY
The district court's decision in Kelley highlights how the courts'
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *8.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *9.
113. Id.
114. Id. (italics added).
115. Id.
2009]
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narrow interpretation of VARA has limited its usefulness in
protecting the moral rights of artists. This section will first explore
the district court's adoption of Phillips to illustrate the court's
incorrect interpretation and consequent narrowing of VARA in
relation to site-specific work. It will analyze the First Circuit's
flawed reasoning and examine VARA's plain language and
legislative intent to determine that VARA protects site-specific
artwork. Second, it will explore the real property policy concern
underlying the courts' decisions in Kelley and Phillips. By
focusing on the district court's flawed reliance on Phillips and its
analysis of originality, this section will also highlight why courts
mistakenly place undue weight on this policy.
A. Incorrect Narrowing of VARA: Site-Specific Work
In Kelley, the district court's decision on site-specific work
illustrates how courts incorrectly interpret VARA to limit the
category of artwork under its protection. First, this section will
explain the district court's incorrect application of the faulty
holding from the First Circuit's decision in Phillips. Second, it
will conclude that site-specific art is protected under VARA, as
indicated by VARA's plain language and legislative intent.
1. The District Court's Incorrect Application of Phillips
The district court erred by not analyzing the site-specific art
reasoning in Phillips before applying it to Kelley. Summarizing
the First Circuit's decision, the district court accepted the First
Circuit's reasoning because "no court in [the Seventh] circuit has
dealt with the issue of VARA's coverage of site-specific art" and
the reasoning was "persuasive," but the district court did not
analyze why it was persuasive. 116 As the following analysis
demonstrates, the First Circuit's holding in Phillips is flawed, and
given that it is not controlling authority, the district court should
have analyzed the issue separately and in relation to the specific
facts in Kelley.
As the following discussion will show, analyzing the Phillips
116. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *6.
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reasoning demonstrates the district court's mistaken application of
Phillips, because the First Circuit incorrectly interpreted the statute
to not protect site-specific artwork. The First Circuit found the
District Court of Massachusetts's holding to be in conflict with the
plain meaning of VARA because, understanding that site-specific
artwork only achieves the artist's meaning in its specific location,
any removal would destroy the artwork." '7 The First Circuit
correctly found that the public presentation exception does not
apply to site-specific art, but its reasoning is flawed and leads to an
overbroad statutory interpretation. "8  The First Circuit
117. Phillips, v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st Cir.
2006). The District Court of Massachusetts held that VARA protected site-
specific artwork but then allowed its removal through the public presentation
exception. Id. at 140. In addition, on appeal, the First Circuit correctly rejected
Phillips's "dual regime" argument. Id. at 141-42. Phillips argued that VARA
when "applied to non-site-specific art [has] a different meaning when applied to
site-specific art." Id. at 141. Under this "dual regime," the public presentation
exception would only apply to "plop art" that could be removed but not to
integrated site-specific art. Id. at 141-42. The First Circuit reasoned that if
Congress intended for VARA to have this regime, it would have added it to the
statute and given the courts some way to determine what is site-specific. Id. at
142. But see Jones, supra note 59, at 386-88. Given that the "dual regime" is
not in the plain language of VARA, the First Circuit correctly rejected Phillips's
argument. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 142. However, Phillips did not need to argue a
'dual regime' into the statute for the court to find that the public presentation
exception does not include site-specific art. See infra note 118 and
accompanying text.
118. The First Circuit should have analyzed the district court's reasoning to
illuminate why the public presentation exception does not apply to site-specific
works and why this does not affect the coverage of site-specific work under
VARA. See generally Garson, supra note 7, at 230; Spotts, supra note 59, at
302-04. The district court in Phillips referenced Board of Managers of Soho
International Arts Condo v. City of New York, No. 01-1226, 2003 WL
21403333, at *10, which states "the point of VARA 'is not to preserve a work of
visual art where it is, but rather to preserve the work as it is."' Phillips, 459
F.3d at 139. This does not support the district court's holding, because if VARA
must protect the work as it is, then Phillips's sculptures must remain in the park
as removal will destroy his work conceptually. See generally Garson, supra
note 7, at 230; Spotts, supra note 59, at 302-04.
Second, the legislative intent does not support the district court's holding, as the
district court pointed to the language that "[g]enerally, the removal of a work
from a specific location comes within the [presentation] exclusion because the
location is a matter of presentation." Phillips, 459 F.3d at 138 (quoting H.R.
2009]
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unequivocally stated that VARA could not protect an artist's work
but then permit its destruction, an interpretation that does not make
sense in the context of the statute as Congress specifically wrote
exceptions to limit VARA's protection of works in certain
situations."9 From this explanation, the court concluded that site-
specific art was either protected or not protected under VARA. 2 o
Illogically, the First Circuit "did not understand how a statute
could apply to a work of art and not protect it" in every
situation. 121
The flaw in the First Circuit's reasoning is that it analyzed the
VARA claim incorrectly.122 When deciding a VARA claim, the
court must first determine whether VARA protects the work by
looking at the threshold questions of whether it is copyrightable
and a work of visual art.'23 Then, the court must consider whether
the work falls into one of the exceptions.'24 In Phillips, the First
Circuit did this backwards by deciding that if a work would be
destroyed by the public presentation exception, then VARA must
not protect the work.'2 5 This incorrect analysis led the First Circuit
REP. No. 101-514, at 16 (1990)). Commentators find this intent instructive to
demonstrate that "Congress specifically contemplated site-specific work as
within VARA's scope, despite the fact that the public presentation exception
limits the protection of such work." Wu, supra note 39, at 162; see also Jones,
supra note 59, at 388. The House Report continues, "[u]nder [the public
presentation exception] galleries and museums continue to have normal
discretion to light, frame, and place works of art. However, conduct that goes
beyond presentation of a work to physical modification of it is actionable."
H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 16 (1990). Here, Congress did not intend for the
public presentation exception to remove site-specific art because it refers to any
physical modification being an actionable offense. But see Jones, supra note 59,
at 386-88. In Phillips, the removal of the sculptures led to the destruction of
the artist's work, which is more than the mere removal of the artwork, but akin
to the physical modification. Phillips, 459 F. 3d at 133-34.
119. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 140. See also supra notes 39-46 and
accompanying text.
120. Id. at 143.
121. Rachel E. Nordby, Note, Off the Pedestal and into the Fire: How
Phillips Chips away at the Rights of Site-Specific Artists, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
167, 190 (2007).
122. See generally Id.
123. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
125. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 140.
[Vol. XX: I
20
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol20/iss1/7
SITE-SPECIFIC WORKS UNDER VARA
to draw the drastic conclusion that site-specific art was not
protected under VARA. "6 Analyzing the First Circuit's reasoning
highlights the flaws in its holding, which the district court may
have discovered if it had engaged in any discussion of Phillips
before wholly accepting the holding as "persuasive."'
' 27
2. VARA's Plain Language and Legislative Intent: Protecting
Site-Specific Art
The First Circuit and the Northern District of Illinois erred
because VARA's plain language and the legislative intent
demonstrate that VARA protects site-specific art. The First
Circuit supported its holding by stating that because the statute
does not explicitly refer to site-specific work, VARA does not
protect the work.'28 However, the statute's silence on site-specific
work does not automatically mean that Congress meant to exclude
the entire genre from protection. 29 In VARA, Congress did not
specifically indicate a type of artwork, but rather used general
categories similar to those used in the Copyright Act. 30 If
Congress wanted to exclude site-specific artwork from VARA, it
could have put it in the negative arm of the statute.' 3' In fact, the
court's exclusion of site-specific work "fractures 'visual art' in
more categories than those enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 101" and
works against the plain language of the statute.
32
Furthermore, the legislative history suggests that Congress
wanted to protect general categories of art. Understanding the
evolving nature of art, Congress created a flexible statute and
126. Id. at 143.
127. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *6.
128. See Nordby, supra note 121, at 190.
129. Id. at 186; 188; Robbins, supra note 10, at 403; Brief of Petitioner-
Appellant, supra note 74, at 21.
130. See Nordby, supra note 121, at 186; Robbins, supra note 10, at 403;
Spotts, supra note 59, at 317-18; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 74, at
21. The Copyright Act protects "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works." 17
U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2006). VARA protects "a painting, drawing, print, or
sculpture." Id. at § 101.
131. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 74, at 21; See also supra note
38 and accompanying text.
132. Robbins, supra note 10, at 404.
2009]
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instructed the courts to use common sense and generally accepted
standards of the artistic community in determining whether a
particular work falls within the scope of the definition. Artists may
work in a variety of media, and use any number of materials in
creating their works. Therefore, whether a particular work falls
within the definition should not depend on the medium or
materials used. 133
VARA's legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
protect works of visual art that contain particular attributes, those
that have the risk of being irrevocably lost if damaged, altered or
destroyed, as opposed to "a mass produced piece of art, such as a
film, song, or book."' 134 This intent further supports the conclusion
that VARA protects site-specific art because it could be
completely lost if damaged or destroyed. 135 Thus, both VARA's
plain language and legislative intent illustrate that the courts in
Phillips and Kelley incorrectly limited the scope of VARA by
holding that it does not protect site-specific artwork.
B. Public Policy: The Restriction of Real Property
Underlying the courts' decisions in Phillips and Kelley is the
policy fear of restricting real property. The United States property
law system is based on the common law ideal that property owners
retain the rights of "free alienability and absolute ownership
against the world" in their property. 136  Under VARA, the site-
specific artist and the real property owner have competing
interests. ' Given that the location is an integral artistic element
of the piece, removal or modification of the artwork would destroy
it conceptually; thus, the artist could have a possible VARA
claim. ' On the other hand, the real property owner has an
important interest in being able to control what rests on his
133. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 11 (1990). See also Nordby, supra note 121,
at 187.
134. Brett Sirota, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act: Federal Versus State
Moral Rights, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 461, 471 (1992).
135. See generally Spotts, supra note 59, at 302-04.
136. Garson, supra note 7, at 214.
137. Spotts, supra note 59, at 302-04.
138. Id. at 303-04.
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property. 3 9 Courts are especially frightened by site-specific work,
because its removal may cause VARA violations that would force
real property owners to lose control over their property.'4 The
fear of restraining property, while not explicit in the district court's
reasoning, is apparent in its application of Phillips and incorrect
holding on originality.
1. The Real Property Policy Concern of Phillips
The district court's fear of restricting real property can be
surmised from its reliance on the Phillips's holding.'4 ' The First
Circuit, motivated by this policy, reasoned that "[o]nce a piece of
art is considered site-specific, and protected by VARA, such
objects could not be altered by the property owner absent consent
of the artist. . . . [This] could dramatically affect real property
interests and laws."' 42 It supported this policy argument by stating
that "[t]he Supreme Court has . . . emphasized the principle that
'statutes which invade the common law are to be read with a
presumption favoring the retention of a long-establish and familiar
principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident."" 4  By applying Phillips, the district court accepts this
policy justification without any analysis of the First Circuit's
reasoning and possible application to the facts in Kelley. Such
analysis demonstrates that the courts unduly rely on the real
property policy justification in order to exclude site-specific
artwork from VARA protection and ignore Congress's intent in
enacting VARA.
First, the First Circuit in Phillips found that because Congress
did not explicitly state that VARA may restrict property, it must
hold that VARA does not protect site-specific work.'44 However,
VARA's purpose is to protect "the reputations of certain visual
139. Id.
140. See generally Garson, supra note 7, at 320; Spotts, supra note 59, at
302-04.
141. See supra notes 115-129 and accompanying text.
142. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 142. See also Robbins, supra note 10, at 404.
143. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 142 (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529,
534 (1993) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
144. Id.
1892009]
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artists and the works of art they create," by granting certain moral
rights to artists.'45 The court failed to acknowledge that sometimes
the enforcement of these rights limits a property owner's rights. 4 '
Congress tried to reduce the restraint on property by enacting a
narrow statute and including exceptions, but the enactment of
VARA, understandably, would have some effect on real property
rights.'47  In addition, the First Circuit jumped to the drastic
conclusion that if VARA protected site-specific work then VARA
would prevent the removal of it.' 48 Yet, once the court determines
that a work is protected under VARA, the analysis does not stop
there.'49 It then must decide if the work is of "recognized stature"
in order to prevent the works destruction, which limits the works
that may restrict property. '50 The First Circuit failed to recognize
that an additional level of analysis under the court's discretion
would be required to prevent the removal of the artwork.'' Thus,
the policy argument of preventing the restriction of property rights
does not adequately support denying VARA rights to site-specific
artwork.
Second, factually distinguishing Kelley from Phillips illustrates
that not all VARA rights restrict real property as severely as courts
fear. In Phillips, the artist sought to prevent the removal of his
sculptures, which consequently restricts the use of the land,
because removal would destroy his work.' However, in Kelley,
145. H.R. REP.No. 101-514, at5 (1990).
146. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
148. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 142.
149. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
150. See Nordby, supra note 121, at 190.
151. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. VARA leaves the
recognized stature determination "open to argument and judicial resolution,"
which gives the courts discretion in deciding what works to protect. Keshawn
M. Harry, A Shattered Visage: the Fluctuation Problem with the Recognized
Stature Proision in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
193, 207-08 (2001) (quoting Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612
(7th Cir. 1999)). Some scholars critique this standard as giving the courts too
much discretion over aesthetic decisions. See Christopher J. Robinson, The
"Recognized Stature" Standard in the Visual Artists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1935, 1965 (2000). See generally Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79
TUL. L. REv. 805 (2005).
152. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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the Park District partially modified Wildflower, thus damaging
Kelley's artistic vision by leaving it mutilated rather than
completely destroyed.'53 Kelley did not try to enjoin the removal
of the work; instead, he tried to recover for the damage to his
work, a remedy that does not restrict real property rights.'54 By
applying Phillips, the district court prevented Kelley from
recovering for any VARA violations, even those that do not
severely restrict real property.'55 Kelley may not recover anything
for the mutilation of his artwork, even though such acts could
damages his artistic integrity and reputation.'56 In addition, if the
Park District associated his name with the current flowerbeds,
under Phillips, Kelley would have no way to preven them from
imposing such an association. " Thus, the district court should not
have adopted the extreme holding of Phillips, because the degree
of real property restriction is distinguishable and should mandate a
different outcome.
2. Fear of Restricting Real Property: Kelley's Originality Holding
Furthermore, the fear of restraining property, while not explicit
in the court's reasoning, would explain the district court's disposal
of Kelley's VARA claim by citing his lack of evidence and
ignoring the relevant case law on originality.'58 The district court
153. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *1
154. Id.
155. See Id. at *7; Nordby, supra note 121, at 186
156. See generally supra note 50 and accompanying text.
157. See generally supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. This is merely
hypothetical. The Park District does not associate the current reconfigured
flower beds with Kelley. Oral Argument Podcast, http://www.podcastdirectory.
com/podshows/5199679.
158. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at * 1. For information regarding the effect
of this holding on copyright and VARA law, see generally Charles Cronin,
Dead on the Vine: Living and Conceptual Art and VARA (August 24, 2009),
http://ssm.com/abstract-1460449 (discusses the problems of granting copyright
to works composed of living material and argues that VARA should not be
extended to such works); Morgan M. Stoddard, Mother Nature as Muse:
Copyright Protection for Works of Art and Photographs Inspired by, Based on,
or Depicting Nature, 86 N.C. L. REv. 572 (2008) (analyzes the issues authors
face to copyright works inspired by, based on, or depicting nature and the courts
treatment of such cases).
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held that Wildflower was not original, because Kelley did not
adequately differentiate his work from other works such as
Monticello's oval gardens and specify which elements are
copyrightable.' 59 Given that "[i]t is, ultimately, for the courts to
determine whether disputed works demonstrate original expression
qualifying them for copyright protection and also for moral rights
protection as works of visual arts," Kelley's lack of proof gave the
district court an easy way to avoid the implications of extending
copyright protection to such a work.'60 If Kelley's work was held
to be original, then other landscape artists could try to obtain
copyright, and consequentially, VARA protection for their work,
potentially leading to increased conflicts and a possible restraint on
property. 161
However, if the district court had analyzed the issue within the
widely accepted originality framework, it would have determined
that Wildflower is original. 62  The Supreme Court, in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., held that
originality "requires 'only that the work was independently created
by the author (as opposed to copied from other works) and that it
possess at least some minimal degree of creativity,"' but it does
not have to be novel. 163  Unless evidence was introduced that
159. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *1. As an example, the district court
directed the reader's attention to a website about Monticello's oval wildflower
gardens. Id. Thomas Jefferson designed twenty oval flowerbeds for his home
in Monticello by choosing a specific plant for each bed ranging from plants
grown in Europe to plants more common to America. The Oval Flower Beds of
Monticello, http://www.monticello.org/gardens/flower/ovalbeds.html. Certainly
one can see the similarity between Jefferson's flower beds and the Work, as
Kelley also specifically chose wildflowers for two oval flowerbeds, but that
does not preclude originality. Compare Id. with Chapman Kelley,
http://www.chapmankelley.com/Artist.asp?ArtistD=9918&Akey=JLBDK6W2.
160. Cronin, supra note 158, at 49; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
10, at § 2.01(B).
161. See generally supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
162. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *1. The Supreme Court in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) set
forth the framework to determine originality in copyrighted work. Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Context, 44 HOus. L. REv. 871, 876 (2007).
163. Kwall, supra note 162, at 876 (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 345). See also
NiMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 2.01(A). As previously mentioned, a
copyrightable work must be an "original [work] of authorship," which include
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Kelley created his living flower artwork after a visit to Monticello,
it is most likely that Kelley created Wildflower independently." 4
Kelley's life work included his elliptical paintings of landscapes
and wildflowers.165  The creation of Wildflower Works I in
Chicago and two other wildflower installations in Texas was an
evolution of this work into a new medium of living plants and
flowers.166 It was the culmination of his life's work rather than a
work inspired by Monticello's flowerbeds.
Additionally, Wildflower meets the "extremely low" standard of
creativity for originality.167 On appeal, in order to prove this
standard, Kelley analogized to Runstadler v. MCM Ltd.
Partnership, 768 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Ill. 1991), where the
plaintiff's "sculpture of 39 clear glass rectangles arranged in a
spiral form," possessed the minimum level of creativity to qualify
as original because "[t]he choice of location, orientation, and
dimensions of the glass panes, and the degree of arc of the spiral,
show far more than a trivial amount of intellectual labor and
artistic expression."'' 68  Similarly, Kelley specifically chose the
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). See supra
notes 31-34 and accompanying text. In addition, in order to be copyrightable a
Work must be "fixed in a tangible medium of expression" and may not be a
"system." Id. at § 102(a)-(b). At trial, the Park District argued that the Work
was not fixed because "it contains living elements" and Kelley described it as
"'a vegetative management system."' Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *6. The
district court's opinion did not discuss either of these arguments focusing on the
issue of originality. Id. On Appeal, Kelley refuted these two additional
arguments in his Response brief. Response and Reply Brief of Petitioner-
Appellant at 11-17, Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 08-3701 & No. 08-3712 (7th
Cir. June 12, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/l6570937/
Chapman-Kelley-Response-and-Reply-Vs-Chicago-Park-District-7th-Circuit-
filed-June-12-2009. During Oral Argument in front of the Seventh Circuit,
these arguments did not seem to be a central issue. See Oral Argument Podcast,
http://www.podcastdirectory.com/podshows/5199679.
164. The current record does not seem to have anything to suggest that
Kelley had any knowledge of the Monticello flowerbeds but in fact these flower
beds were introduced solely as an example by the district court. Kelley, 2008
WL 4449886, at *6.
165. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 74, at 4-5.
166. Id. at 3-5.
167. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 74, at
14.
168. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 74, at 14 (quoting Runstadler,
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placement, location and variety of flowers within two elliptical
flower beds demonstrating "more than a trivial amount of
intellectual labor and artistic expression." '69 Furthermore,
Wildflower was the culmination of Kelley's artistic vision as he
created three dimensional works of his elliptical wildflower
paintings demonstrating his creativity. 7 ' Thus, Wildflower meets
the minimal level for creativity.
Finally, the district court incorrectly implied that originality is
synonymous with novelty. The district court stated, "Kelley leaves
this Court to assume that he is the first person to ever conceive of
and express an arrangement of growing wildflowers in ellipse-
shaped enclosed areas," suggesting that Wildflower must be
novel.171 However, the district court incorrectly applied the law
from Feist, because "[o]riginality does not signify novelty; a work
may be original even though it closely resembles other works so
long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying." 172
Even though other oval shaped flower beds may exist, that does
not preclude Wildflower from being original. Thus, if the district
court had analyzed the facts within the Feist framework, it would
have determined that Wildflower is original. 173
V. "A LITTLE WIND": PROTECTING ARTISTS THROUGH CONTRACTS
Even though VARA clearly protects site-specific art, this causes
a problem because it potentially leads to the restriction of real
property rights.'74 Courts fix this problem by holding that VARA
does not protect site-specific work, but it is unnecessary to go to
such a drastic outcome in order to prevent the restriction of
768 F. Supp. at 1295-96).
169. Id. at 14-15 (quoting Runstadler, 768 F. Supp. at 1295-96).
170. Id. at4-5.
171. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *1, *6. See also Cronin, supra note 158,
at 5; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 74, at 15-16.
172. Fiest, 499 U.S. at 345. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 74,
at 15-16.
173. At oral argument, the judges seemed to very receptive to the Plaintiffs
argument that his work was original. Judge Skyes commented that "the statute
doesn't require a huge degree of creativity or originality. It's a very, very low
threshold." Transcript at Oral Argument, supra note 116, at 7.
174. See generally supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
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property. 75 Unfortunately, until Congress clarifies whether site-
specific works are protected under VARA or finds a solution to the
property issue, artists are forced to use contracts, as seen in pre-
VARA cases, in order to protect their rights.'76 Thus, artists must
be educated about their rights and become knowledgeable about
certain contract provisions besides waiver that could more
adequately protect them. 177
An important issue to consider is the artist's waiver of VARA
rights, which can only be done in writing. 78  Some scholars
believe that artists should be forced to waive their VARA rights
when installing artwork on real property.1 79 In practice, property
owners control the money and land, and thus have greater
bargaining power which may force an emerging artist to waive his
rights in order to secure a commission. 8 ° Although it has been
175. See generally supra notes 141-58 and accompanying text.
176. See generally supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
177. See generally Nordby, supra note 121, at 192; Russ VerSteeg, Federal
Moral Rights for Visual Artists: Contract Theory and Analysis, 67 WASH. L.
REv. 827, 843, 845-47 (1992). At the VARA Senate hearings, Congress
considered enacting an exception that included both works installed in buildings
and public structures, defining public structures as "[a]ny bridge, aqueduct, or
other public edifice either owned or operated by the United States Government,
a State, a political subdivision thereof, or any government agency therein, or
erected on land owned by the United States Government, a state, a political
subdivision thereof, or any governmental Agency therein." Garson, supra note
7, at n. 209 (quoting Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws: Hearings on S. 1198
and S. 1253 Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 19, 118 (statement of Peter
H. Karlan, Attorney, La Jolla, California)). This provision would "ensure 'that
property containing fine art remains freely alienable."' Monica Pa and
Christopher Robinson, Making Lemons out of Lemons, 3 LANDSL 22, n. 18
(2009) (quoting Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws: Hearings on S. 1198 and
S. 1253 Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 19, 116-17 (June 20, 1989)). If
Congress chose to revise VARA to include this provision, it would prevent
many issues with site-specific work because it would require the artist and
property owner to sign a contract before the installation of the work that allowed
removal, even if removal caused destruction or modification.
178. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (2006).
179. Garson, supra note 7, at 240-43.
180. Nordby, supra note 121, at 191; Thurston, supra note 7, at 716-17. On
the other hand, some scholars argue that VARA's implementation has granted
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suggested that "[a]rtists concerned about permanence and integrity
of their work can refuse to grant such waivers," that is not practical
to an emerging artist with few options. 'l The following
provisions, although not ideal solutions to these problems, may
help artists more adequately protect their rights but the artist's own
personal circumstances must be considered to determine the
appropriate solution. 182
Instead of a waiver, an artist may insist on a buyout clause
allowing the artist to purchase the work if the property owner
wishes to move it instead of waiving his right of integrity at the
creation of the artwork.'83 However, if he is unable to buy the
work at that time, then the artist would at that point waive his right
of integrity, allowing the removal of the work.' 4 Alternatively, an
artist may protect his work by "negotiat[ing] the number of years
the buyer must preserve the work, which would reduce the
possibility of confusion over property rights."' 5
Another option includes "notice provisions [in the contract]...
to ensure that the artist has fair warning if the buyer intends to
remove or alter the work," as illustrated in Kelley."8 6 The Park
District's first permit gave "a 90 day notice to remove the
planting," if it wanted to change the property.8 7 The Court held
that the Park District breached an implied extension of this permit
when it failed to give him reasonable notice to remove
Wildflower.' Even though Kelley lost on the VARA claim, he
artists more bargaining power. Thurston, supra note 7, at 718; VerSteeg, supra
note 177, at 843-44. In Phillips, "the attorney for Phillips suggested that moral
rights do more to level the negotiating playing field, and both the artist and the
buyer benefit if they know where they stand with regard to display and removal
of the work." Thurston, supra note 7, at 718.
181. Nordby, supra note 121, at 191. See also Thurston, supra note 7, at
716-17.
182. For more information on issues to consider when drafting contracts for
artists, see VerSteeg, supra note 177, at 843-71; Pa & Robinson, supra note
177, at 27-28.
183. Nordby, supra note 121, at 191-92.
184. Id. at 192.
185. Thurston, supra note 7, at 719.
186. Id. at 718. See also VerSteeg, supra note 177, at 865.
187. Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *1.
188. Id. at *8.
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recovered on a contract claim.' 89 This lends further evidence of
the importance of a contract in this situation.
VI. CONCLUSION
As Kelley illustrates, the federal courts, fearing restraint of
property, mistakenly interpret VARA's plain language and further
narrow the statute by excluding site-specific art from the scope of
the statute's protection. This goes against the ultimate purpose of
VARA to encourage artistic creation by protecting "the reputations
of certain visual artists and the works of art they create."' 90 Until
Congress or the courts strengthen VARA, artists must rely on
contracts to protect their rights. Ultimately, some change in
interpretation must come to make VARA more effective in
protecting artists. Perhaps change will be a "stealthy perfume of
wildflowers hidden in the grass," but for the sake of artists it
should come from Congress or the Seventh Circuit. '9'
Virginia M. Cascio
189. Id. Certainly Kelley did not recover any damages for the breach of the
implied contract but the court was correct in holding that he did not adequately
prove damages. It does not reflect on the strength of the claim.
190. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 5 (1990).
191. Steinbeck, supra note 1, at 20.
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